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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

regulation. Since this court did not know the value of the three
parcels together, it remanded for consideration of the reduction in
Further, the court directed the trial court to
property value.
determine whether to include the fourth parcel in the analysis.
Shana Smilovits

MINNESOTA
Johnson v. City of Eagan, 584 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. 1998)
(municipalities cannot impose an otherwise legitimate fee to recover
public improvement costs from parties who previously received a
judicial determination that the original assessment value exceeded the
benefit a particular property received from the improvement).
In 1992, the City of Eagan authorized an improvement project,
and assessed the value of the project against the benefiting subdivision
properties. The city charged all landowners that benefited from the
improvement project based on the number of frontage feet the
benefiting property had. The Johnsons challenged the original
assessment for their property and received a judicial determination
that the amount the Johnsons were charged exceeded the benefit they
received. Accordingly, the court reduced the Johnson's fee by
approximately 50 percent.
When the Johnsons decided to connect to city water in 1996, the
city charged a standard connection fee. In addition, the city also
charged a "lateral benefit water fee" which essentially compensated the
city for the original 50 percent reduction in the special assessment.
The city only charged the "lateral benefit water fee" to those
landowners who had received judicially reduced assessments.
The Johnsons did not challenge the standard connection fee, but
contended that the additional fee was improper and requested a
refund. Although both the trial court and court of appeals believed
the additional fee was "a permissible means of recovering the full cost
of the improvement," the Minnesota Supreme Court found the
additional fee, in light of the previous judicial assessment, was an
unconstitutional taking of the Johnson's property.
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that municipalities have
the authority to levy special assessments against benefiting landowners
as a legitimate means of recovering costs for a public improvement
project. The court also recognized, however, that "[a] n assessment in
excess of the benefit conferred by the local improvement on the
property assessed is an unconstitutional taking of private property."
When an improvement's cost exceeds its benefit, "the difference must
not be borne by a particular property, but instead by the municipality
as a whole."
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Addressing the city's contention that Minnesota statutes allow it to
recover costs through use, availability, or connection charges, taxes, or
special assessments, the court stated that this authority is limited. Both
the Johnsons and the court recognized that a city has the power to
collect improvement costs via availability or connection charges,
special assessments, or taxes. A municipality is not allowed, however,
to recover judicially disallowed fees through an otherwise legitimate
exercise of its authority. The court noted that "such a charge is
impermissible if it is imposed discriminatorily as a way of subverting [a
reduction or avoidance of an assessment]."
Because the "lateral benefit fee" was assessed against only those
landowners that received judicially reduced assessments, the court
determined that the fee in this case was an improper special
assessment.
The court held that "this fee constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of private property and is impermissible
regardless of whether the recoupment effort is under the guise of an
assessment or a connection charge." Accordingly, the Johnsons
received a refund for the amount that exceeded the previous judicial
decree.
MichaelFischer

NEW HAMPSHIRE
Greenan v. Lobban, 717 A.2d 989 (N.H. 1998) (holding that grantor
intended to convey title of land extending to lake's shore line and that
non-riparians did not gain right-of-way to the beach outside of
delineated boundaries by a prescriptive or a deeded right-of-way).
Defendant owned riparian lots on Newfound Lake ("Lake") in
Bridgewater, New Hampshire. The plaintiffs owned non-riparian lots
with ten-foot-wide right-of-way easements for access to the Lake's
beach. The plaintiffs used the beach in front of and near the right-ofway for forty years. Beginning in the 1980s the defendants asked the
plaintiffs to restrict their use to the area inside the right-of-way's
boundaries. Because the plaintiffs refused, the defendants constructed
barriers and posted "no trespassing" signs on either side of the right of
way.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants to quiet title claiming deeded
and prescriptive rights to use the beach up to the natural high water
mark. The lower court rejected the plaintiffs' contention and ruled
that the defendants owned the beach to the high water line and owned
exclusive littoral rights to the water and lakebed. However, the court
found that the location of the plaintiffs' deeded right-of-way extended
beyond the delineated boundaries; thus, the plaintiffs could traverse
additional land.

